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Joint responsibility is a mental and behavioural state which captures and formalizes
many of the intuitive underpinnings of collaborative problem solving. It deﬁnes the
pre-conditions which must hold before such activity can commence, how individuals
should behave (in their own problem solving and towards others) once such problem
solving has begun and minimum conditions which group participants must satisfy.
1. JOINT ACTION: AN INTRODUCTION
In an environment composed of multiple agents there are many different forms of social
activity which can occur (eg cooperation, competition and hostility). The aim of this paper is
to provide a framework in which one particular class of social activity can be formalised and
ultimately analysed: namely that in which a group of autonomous agents (at least two)
decides they wish to work together as a team to solve a common problem. A comprehensive
theory describing this class of social interaction would need to cover at least the following
aspects: when to initiate team activity, how to go about assembling the team, how to plan and
distribute work within the team, how to behave once team activity has been initiated and how
to complete team activity. The framework described herein deﬁnes the prerequisites for such
action and also prescribes how agents should behave (both in their own problem solving and
with respect to other group members) once the problem solving has been established.
Typically in a community of autonomous agents, one of the primary motives for joint action
is when no individual is capable of achieving a desired objective alone; only by combining
and coordinating with others can the target be reached. Joint action is usually a reciprocal pro-
cess in which participating agents augment their objectives and problem solving to comply
with those of others - hence it is a fairly sophisticated form of cooperation. It requires greater
knowledge, awareness and reﬂection by an agent both with respect to its own problem solving
objectives and about their compatibility with the objectives of others, than simpler forms of
social interaction (such as task and result sharing [19]).
Joint action, by deﬁnition, requires an objective the group wishes to achieve - it is the glue
which binds the team together. As a consequence of the autonomous nature of the agents, team
members will only participate if they can derive some beneﬁt from the interaction (i.e. benevo-
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for realising a collective goal - agents also need to agree upon a means of reaching the target
state. Previous work on collaborative problem solving [11], [16], [17], [18], [20] has concen-
trated on deﬁning joint intentionality in terms of goal states, without consideration of how
goals can be achieved (plan states) or how participants should behave when engaged in collab-
orative problem solving. The fundamental notion behind our work is that any comprehensive
description of joint action should include all of these aspects. Therefore we present a mental
and behavioural state (called joint responsibility) which internalises for each team member the
notion of solving problems in a group. Joint responsibility deﬁnes the pre-conditions necessary
for joint action as well as descriptions of how others will act, both in performing their social
problem solving and in participating in collaborative interaction per se. This formalization is
especially important if agents are to operate in dynamic and complex environments in which
their aims and objectives are likely to alter during the course of a prolonged cooperative inter-
action. Also if we are to move to environments in which agents are more autonomous in
nature, then it is important that many of the assumptions presently hidden in the agents’ control
structures are made explicit and can be subjected to an agents reasoning processes.
In the remainder of this paper the notion of joint responsibility as a pre-requisite for joint
action is developed. Section two describes a scenario in which joint problem solving by a team
of autonomous agents is beneﬁcial to all participants and also enhances the quality of the out-
put to the user, while section three introduces and formalizes the notion of joint responsibility.
2. FAULT RECOVERY IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
The domain in which the principles related to joint action will be illustrated is that of fault
recovery in electricity distribution networks - this example is loosely based on an ARCHON
application [12], [13], [21]. The scenario involves three pre-existing systems each of which has
a set of clearly deﬁned goals and is capable of sophisticated problem solving in its own right.
The fault diagnosis agent can detect and indicate to the other two that a fault has occurred in
the network. The restoration planning agent (RA) is responsible for constructing a mainte-
nance plan once a fault has been detected - such a plan will instruct the operator to perform
certain sequences of operations in a well deﬁned order. The network simulation agent (NSA) is
capable of running and explaining “what-if” simulations of the network based on the settings
of certain key parameters. One joint action which can be instantiated between the NSA and RA












FAULTSnetwork to fail (i.e. “sensible” restoration plans). As a standalone system, the plans suggested
by the RA may lead to further faults as the speciﬁed operations can overload currently working
components. However if the RA’s tentative restoration plan is ﬁrst sent to the NSA then its
effects can be predicted, problem areas highlighted and the plan reﬁned accordingly. If major
problems are identiﬁed and the RA decides to signiﬁcantly revise its restoration plan then there
may be further interaction with the NSA. If only minor modiﬁcations are made or the RA
deems the highlighted risks acceptable, then no further interaction will be necessary.
3. JOINT RESPONSIBILITY
Joint responsibility deﬁnes the conditions which need to be satisﬁed before joint action can be
initiated and a code of conduct specifying how agents should react when the joint action
becomes unsustainable. Joint responsibility will be deﬁned using a logical formalism, similar
to that described in [4]. This formalism has the usual connectives of a ﬁrst order language (^
AND, v OR, ~NOT) - as well as operators for propositional attitudes. BEL(x, p) and GOAL(x,
p) mean agent x has p as a belief and a goal respectively, MB({x, y}, p) that x and y mutually
believe p. Dynamic logic constructs are also used [8]: Tp means p is always true and ◊p that p
will eventually be true. p?;a means “action a with p holding initially”, and analogously for
a;p?. This analysis will be exempliﬁed using the restoration planning agent (RA) and the net-
work simulation agent (NSA), although it can of course be applied to groups of arbitrary size.
3.1 Common Goals and Joint Persistence
The ﬁrst step to achieving joint action is that a group of two or more agents realize that they
have a common objective (intention2) and that this can only (best) be fulﬁlled by collaborating
with others. Once this is believed by all participants, a common goal exists and each individual
becomes committed [4] to achieving that objective. However as Levesque et al. point out, this
is not a sufﬁciently sturdy foundation upon which robust joint action can be based [11]; it is
particularly fragile if agents intentions change (i.e. they reach a state in which they are no
longer committed to attaining the common objective). To rectify these problems, they propose
the notion of joint persistent goals (JPGs) [11] in which groups of agents become jointly com-
mitted to a common aim. The properties of JPGs can best be illustrated using an example. Sup-
pose the RA and the NSA have established a JPG of producing a sensible restoration plan and
then at some later stage one of the agents (say the NSA) no longer desires this objective
(because the user has asked it to run a what-if question on the network as a high priority task).
Should it simply drop the common goal without informing the RA?, meaning that the RA will
be left waiting indeﬁnitely. Clearly not! Therefore in the interests of robust group problem
solving, a JPG requires that the NSA adopts the goal of informing the RA of its change of
intention. Thus, JPGs deﬁne the conditions under which a commitment to a joint goal can be
dropped and also how participants should act when they ﬁnd themselves in such a situation.
3.2 Solution Commitment
Contrary to the claims of Levesque et al. [11], having a JPG is not sufﬁcient for obtaining joint
action. JPG’s only specify that agents have a common desire to reach a target state, they do not
specify how to reach this state. Agreeing upon a means of reaching the state is nearly as impor-
2. Intentions have been ascribed a variety of differing meanings (eg [3], [4], [24])- within this context
they specify a desired or target state, without consideration of how that state is to be attained.tant as the desire to reach the state itself. Therefore although NSA and RA may be able to agree
that they want to produce a restoration plan together, unless they can agree upon a common
means of achieving this then joint action will not follow. In some circumstances, such agree-
ment may be impossible because of the autonomous nature of the agents involved; both agents
may have several objectives at any one time and these must be balanced with the desire to pro-
duce a sensible restoration plan. If they have insufﬁcient resources or it conﬂicts with other
more important intentions then it may be impossible for them to converge upon a common
solution, even though they share a common objective.
There are several facets to agreeing upon a common solution, ﬁrstly the strategy by which the
solution will be produced (i.e. the group’s organizational structure) and then development and
agreement of the actual plan steps. Within this framework we are not concerned with the mech-
anisms used for achieving the common solution; rather we are concerned with the fact that they
must agree upon the principle that a common plan is needed to tackle the joint problem.
3.2.1 Plan Representation Language
In a multi-agent environment the plan representation language must include the agent(s) which
will perform the action as well as the action itself. In situations in which agents act collabora-
tively it is essential to be able to describe activities in terms of groups of agents, rather than just
in terms of individuals3. Therefore the fact that a group of agents {α1,..,αn} will work together
in order to try and achieve σ will be represented as follows: < {α1,..,αn}, σ >. Let the set of all
agents existing in the environment be denoted by A; unless stated to the contrary, all groups of
agents are a subset of the members of A.
Intentions will typically be composed of sub-intentions which are themselves decomposable -
the solution graph for σ being represented by Σσ. The nodes without successors (when the
graph has been fully expanded) correspond to atomic units of activity (primitive actions) which
are executable by individual agents. The various stages of intention execution4 can be
expressed as follows:
EXECUTE/EXECUTING/EXECUTED(< {α1,..,αn}, σ >, Σσ)
which respectively mean that Σσ will be executed next, is being executed now or has been exe-
cuted, for the purpose of achieving σ by agents {α1,..αn}. Underlying this deﬁnition is the
assumption that at least one team member (or a subset of them) is (are) capable of realising the
constituent sub-intentions and that team members will not attempt actions which they cannot
execute to some degree.
3.2.2 Inter-Related Actions
Typically the solution of a joint action contains some actions which need to be coordinated
with those of other agents and some which can be executed independently. Solutions will
therefore contain interrelated components: Σσ = {σ1 ℜ1,2 σ2, σ3 ℜ3,4 σ4,....}. ℜ1,2 defines
the relationship between σ1 and σ2
5 (see Allen’s taxonomy of temporal relationships [1] or
3.  This representation is consistent with social psychology work in which the society is considered prior
to the individual, not the other way around [15] and has also been independently noted in [10] & [16].
4. Execution in this context corresponds to searching through the space of partial plans if a node is
expandable or processing a primitive action if not.
5. ℜ is a non-commutative, non-associative n-ary operation (n ≥ 2).plan transformations of action-ordering plans [9]). Such relationships are an integral compo-
nent of the solution specification and if they are not satisfied then the desired objective cannot
be guaranteed by solution Σσ. Hence fulfilling an intention means performing the actions and
satisfying any relationships which exist with other actions6:
 (∀ <{αw... αx}, σi> ∈ Σσ) (∃ <{αy... αz}, σj> ∈ Σσ) ℜi,j ⊃
MB({αw... αx}, ℜi,j)?; EXECUTE(<{αw... αx}, σi>, Σσi)
The success of a solution in reaching its desired objective is the ﬁnal component of the plan
representation language:
ACHIEVE(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σσ) ⇔ ~σ ^ EXECUTE(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σσ); σ?
meaning if Σσ is executed next, σ which did not hold before this sequence of actions, will hold
as a direct consequence of performing the speciﬁed actions.
3.2.3 Example of Formalism
To illustrate this formalism, the intention of producing a sensible restoration plan can be
expressed as follows: σ = < {RA, NSA}, SENSIBLE-RESTORATION-PLAN> and one solu-
tion for achieving this is:




3.2.4 Deﬁning Solution Commitment
It is now possible to express the second pre-condition for joint action (the ﬁrst being the exist-
ence of a common objective), namely: that the participants must agree upon the principle that a
common solution is needed if the objective is to be achieved:
NEED-COMMON-SOLUTION (<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ⇔
MB({α1,..,αn}, ◊ ∃Σσ EXECUTE(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σσ) v T~σ)
The idea that joint action requires a common solution is also expressed either implicitly (eg
through the deﬁnition of roles [24]) or explicitly (eg [7], [14]) in most joint intention work.
However what is lacking in previous work is a prescription of how team members should
behave once such a solution has been developed. The notion of solution commitment ﬁlls this
gap: deﬁning under what conditions an agent should and should not follow the agreed solution
and how it should behave when it is no longer rational for it to keep to the solution. Before the
complete set of circumstances can be described the terms invalid, unattainable and violated
need to be deﬁned (illustrations are taken from the sensible restoration plan example):
Deﬁnition: Invalid Plan - following the plan no longer leads to the desired goal
INVALID (<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ) ⇔ T~ACHIEVE(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σσ)
6.Fulﬁlling relationships is a process requiring communication and synchronization between the respon-
sible agents. Details of how this is achieved are not described in this papereg the NSA believes the network status has changed substantially since the simulation to
judge the effect of the tentative restoration plan was started; meaning its analysis will be
inaccurate as essential information is missing. Hence it is impossible to tell whether the
restoration plan is safe or not without redoing the simulation - a futile activity because the
tentative restoration plan will be signiﬁcantly altered by the new information. Therefore
following the agreed solution will not produce the desired result.
Deﬁnition: Unattainable Plan - one of the speciﬁed plan steps cannot be executed
UNATTAINABLE (<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ) ⇔
(∃ <{αw,..,αx}, σi> ∈ Σσ) T∼EXECUTE(<{αw,..,αx}, σi> Σσ)
where [{αw,..,αx} ⊆ {α1,..,αn}]
eg to simulate the effects of the RA’s restoration plan, the NSA has to set simulation
parameters outside their permitted range - meaning the simulation cannot be executed.
Deﬁnition: Violated Plan - one of the plan steps which should have been performed has not
been performed, or a relationship between plan steps has not been upheld. This differs from
unattainability in that the action could feasibly have been executed, but the agents involved did
not do so.
VIOLATED (<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ) ⇔ ~EXECUTED(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σσ)
eg the RA has sent a tentative plan to the NSA which has run a simulation and highlighted
potential problem areas. However because a major incident has occurred on the network,
the RA decides that rather than reﬁning the tentative plan it is better to try and generate a
new plan because the information will be more up-to-date. In this case, the RA has violated
the agreed plan by not performing the reﬁnement task.
In addition to these plan states, it would be irrational for an agent to remain committed to a
solution if either the plan’s objective already holds or another team member is no longer com-
mitted to the agreed solution. An example of the former situation is if the NSA calculates that
the proposed tentative plan will cause no additional problems in the network - therefore the
joint objective of producing a sensible restoration plan has already been met and no additional
work is required. An example of the latter occurs if the RA no longer believes it possible to
produce a restoration plan given the current context, then there is no point in the NSA evaluat-
ing the proposed restoration plan as the result will simply be irrelevant to the RA.
We are now in a position to deﬁne the conditions under which it is rational for an agent to stop
performing actions speciﬁed in the agreed solution. Hence, unless these conditions prevail, an
individual agent (α) should remain committed (I-COMMIT-CONDS) to solution Σσ as a
means of achieving σ:
I-COMMIT-CONDS(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ) ⇔[ α ∈ {α1,..,αn}]
BEL(α, ~σ) ^
BEL(α, ~INVALID(<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ)) ^
BEL(α, ~UNATTAINABLE(<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ)) ^
BEL(α, ~VIOLATED(<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ)) ^
BEL(α, (∀αi ∈{α1,..,αn} I-COMMIT-CONDS(αi, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ)))Once an agent believes one (or more) of the above conditions to be true, it should stop per-
forming all associated group problem solving activity and re-evaluate the situation. However
merely stopping local activity fails to capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about what it means
to solve problems in a group. In such circumstances, individuals must endeavour to inform
other team members that they are no longer committed to the solution and the reason for this.
Based on this intuition, it is now possible to formalize how individuals within the team should
act once a common solution has been derived and agreed upon. This behaviour is called indi-
vidual solution commitment (ISC):
ISC(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ) ⇔[ α ∈ {α1,..,αn}]
 UNTIL ~I-COMMIT-CONDS(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ),
 (∀ <{αw,..αx}, σi> ∈ Σσ) ^ (α ∈ {αw,..αx}) ⊃[ {αw...αx}⊆ {α1...αn}]
BEL(α, ◊EXECUTE(<{αw,..αx}, σi>, Σσi)) ^
EXECUTE(<{αw,..αx}, σi>, Σσi))
 WHEN GOAL(α, MB({α1,..αn}, ~I-COMMIT-CONDS(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ)))7
From this deﬁnition it is apparent that a group member will try and fulﬁl its obligations speci-
ﬁed in the agreed solution whilst it is still committed to that solution as a means of achieving
the desired result - on becoming uncommitted it endeavours to inform others of this fact. What
happens when all team members are aware of the lack of ISC by an agent within their ranks
depends upon the reason for the loss of commitment. Such behaviour can include stopping all
associated activity indeﬁnitely, replanning using existing team members or trying to recruit
new members to the group - however the link between such actions and the reason for the of
loss of ISC is left for another time.
Deﬁnition: Combining the results of this section, there are two facets concerned with actions
for achieving a target state: there is the principle of agreeing to the need for a common solution
and also a deﬁnition of how group members should behave once such a solution has been
agreed upon. These two components can be joined together into a single proposition called
solution commitment:
SOLUTION-COMMITMENT(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ⇔
MB({α1,..,αn}, NEED-COMMON-SOLUTION(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>)) ^
(∀ αi ∈ {α1,..αn} ISC(αi,< { α1,..αn}, σ>, Σσ))
Solution commitment has been developed independently of the group organization structure
and mechanism used for reaching the common solution; therefore it is applicable across a wide
range of paradigms - one agent planning for all others [22], the plan being developed collabo-
ratively [5], being developed in one go or through incremental reﬁnement, decisions taken by
majority or requiring consensus and so on. Returning to our example, this means the RA and
the NSA have to agree upon the principle that a common plan is needed for producing a sensi-
ble restoration plan. Once agreed, a common solution can be developed and both agents will
endeavour to do their parts (eg the RA will generate a tentative plan, the NSA will highlight
any potential problem areas and the RA will then reﬁne it based on this information). They will
continue to do this until the task is completed satisfactorily, one of them ﬁnds the agreed solu-
tion unsustainable or discovers the other is no longer committed to the solution.
7. UNTIL p,q WHEN r: until p is true, q will remain true. When (if) p becomes true, r will become true3.3 Contributions
An important attribute which is missing from previous descriptions of joint action is that of
group minimality; stated simply, to be included in a group an agent must be able to contribute
something! In the restoration plan example, the joint action is between the RA and the NSA
and it makes no sense for any other agent to be involved, because it would be unable to carry
out useful problem solving in the cooperation context. This property of group members is both
conceptual (“free-loading” in a group is undesirable) and pragmatic (the time and communica-
tion resource consumed coordinating group activity is usually proportional to the size of the
group, therefore it makes sense to only include individuals who carry out activities beneﬁcial
to the group’s objectives). There are two ways in which an agent can contribute to the attain-
ment of a group goal: it can perform an act which is part of the agreed solution (positive contri-
bution) or it may refrain from performing an action which would interfere with the agreed
solution (non-negative contribution). Imagine a team of agents trying to stack blocks B1, B2
and B3 - a positive contribution could be putting B2 onto B1, a non-negative one not unstack-
ing B2. However due to space limitations we will only consider positive contributions.
Deﬁnition: A sub-intention can potentially contribute to a parent intention if it is a component
of any solution (however inefﬁcient or cumbersome) which achieves the parent intention:
CONTRIBUTES (<{αj,..,αk}, σi>, <{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ⇔
(∃ Σσ ACHIEVE(<{αw,..,αx}, σ>, Σσ) ^ <{αj,..,αk}, σi> ∈ Σσ
where [{αw,..,αx} ⊆ {α1,..,αn}] and [{αj,..,αk} ⊆ {αw,..,αx}]
The ﬁrst stage is for the individual to believe that it is capable of offering something to the
group. Once an individual is sure of this, it then has to convince others that it’s inclusion will
beneﬁt the group. Concentrating on the former, an agent is capable of contributing to the group
goal if it can achieve a sub-intention which is a component of a potential overall solution:
CAN-CONTRIBUTE(α, <{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ⇔
ACHIEVE(<{αw,..,αx}, σi>, Σσi) ^ [{αw,.,αx}⊆ {α1,αn}]
CONTRIBUTES(<{αw,..,αx}, σi>, <{α1,..,αn}, σ>) [α ∈ {αw,..αx}]
The potential of being able to contribute to the attainment of a goal is not sufﬁcient to guaran-
tee entry into a group; it must be believed that the individual actually intends to participate:
WILL-PARTICIPATE(α, <{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ⇔ [α ∈ {α1,..αn}]
◊SOLUTION-COMMITMENT(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>)
An agent will only be admitted into joint problem solving activity if all group members are
ﬁrstly convinced that the agent is capable of contributing to the objective and secondly that
they believe it will actually participate:
MAY-CONTRIBUTE(α,< { α1,..,αn}, σ>) ⇔ [α ∈ {α1,..αn}]
MB({α1,..,αn}, CAN-CONTRIBUTE(α,< { α1,..,αn}, σ>)) ^
MB({α1,..,αn}, WILL-PARTICIPATE(α,< { α1,..,αn}, σ>))
This is a conservative approach to setting up groups of cooperating agents, in that all team
members must agree to the participation of each individual even before a solution has beendeveloped. In many situations (particularly involving humans), it is difﬁcult to determine
before a solution has actually been developed whether an individual is capable of contributing.
Therefore a more pragmatic approach may be to weaken this condition and allow agents to par-
ticipate in the subsequent solution development phase on the basis that they alone believe they
can contribute. This means at the outset of group formation, agents which have no possible
means of contributing can be ruled out and then at a later stage when the actual solution is
developed superﬂuous agents can be removed.
3.4 And Finally: Joint Responsibility
We are now in a position of being able to describe the mental state which a group of agents
must adopt if they are to jointly solve a common problem:
JOINT-RESPONSIBILITY (<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ⇔
MB ({α1,..,αn}, JPG(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>)) ^
MB ({α1,..,αn}, SOLUTION-COMMITMENT (<{α1,..,αn}, σ>)) ^
MB ({α1,..,αn}, (∀ αi ∈ {α1,..αn} MAY-CONTRIBUTE(αi, <{α1,..,αn}, σ>))
4. CONCLUSIONS
The work presented in this paper is a synthesis and extension of previous work in the ﬁelds of
multi-agent planning and joint intentions and provides a foundation upon which robust and
sophisticated collaborative problem solving can be based. Joint responsibility offers, for the
ﬁrst time, a model which deﬁnes the pre-conditions which need to be satisﬁed before joint
action can commence as well as a prescription of how agents should behave when engaged in
collaborative problem solving. The theory as described assumes that the group is formed
dynamically, but covers already existing organizational structures as a special case. A code of
conduct for group problem solving is particularly important in situations in which agents’ plan
and goal states alter dynamically (eg in complex real world environments [13]) or when
engaged in prolonged social activity.
Responsibility is also capable of providing a degree of trust upon which all social interactions
must be based [2]: team members can carry out problem solving activity safe in the knowledge
that others will be doing their bit, and if they are not then they will at least be endeavouring to
inform other team members of this fact. Such assurances mean that as far as can be avoided,
agents will not be wasting valuable computational effort pursuing activities which will ulti-
mately serve no purpose, because group actions often only make sense when performed within
the context of the group’s activities.
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